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I.

SCOPE OF ENGAGEMENT AND REPORT
1.

At the request of Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., I submit this review and

evaluation of the Expert Report of Kevin F. Dages ("Dages" individually or
"Dages Report") submitted on July 29, 2016. This report should be read in
conjunction with my Expert Report filed on July 29, 2016 ("Marcus Report") and
all capitalized terms herein are consistent with the definitions in the Marcus
Report.
2.

I submit this report in accordance with rules of the Court of Chancery

of the State of Delaware. The analysis and opinions contained herein are based on
information available as of the date of thjs report. I reserve the right to supplement
and/or amend this report should any additional information become available. The
professional fees for my services are not contingent upon the outcome of this
matter or the opinions expressed herein. In addition to the documents and other
information I relied upon in preparing the Marcus Report, the list of documents
and other information I relied upon in performing my analysis set forth below is
attached to this submission. This report presents a summary of my methodologies,
findings, and conclusions.

II.

OVERVIEW OF THE DAGES REPORT
3.

The Dages Report attempts to paint a bleak picture of the WLAN

market generally, and Aruba' s prospects specifically, including its ability to remain

1
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independent and the supposed impending departure of CEO On. In doing so, the
Dages Report fails to acknowledge Aruba's record-breaking actual performance in
Q2 2015 (in both revenues and margins), growing market share, the positive
statements made by Aruba's management to the public and internally, and the
positive view held by many analysts covering the Company at the time. Further,
while attempting to cause the reader to infer a need to sell the Company based on
this negative outlook combined with leadership transition issues, the Dages Report
provides no evidence that the Company was for sale ptior to it being approached
by HP, that Orr would abandon the Company and put his substantial equity stake at
risk, or that management or the majority of analyst shared similar concerns about
Aruba's future at the time. In fact, the median security analyst PT increased from
$24.00 to $26.00 after Aruba released its Q2 2015 financial results (see Exhibit 1)
and the increase in the PTs was not, for the majority of the analysts reviewed,
based on the rumor of an HP acquisition of Aruba as Dages asserts. Finally, Dages
identifies no reason to believe that the contemporaneously prepared February 2015
Proje,ctions did not incorporate management's and the Board's expectations for
Aruba.
4.

Dages claims to rely on a DCF model usmg the February 2015

Proje,ctions in calculating a $19.85 per share fair value of Aruba as of May 18,
2015. Dages, however, makes two inappropriate adjustments to the February 2015
2
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Proje·ctions and relies on a series of inconect assumptions that lead to a valuation
lower than almost all contemporaneous indications of value, including the DCF
analyses performed by the investment bankers charged with advising both Aruba
and HP. Further, Dages assumes that a "robust" sales process led to a transaction
value that, when reduced for synergies he believes were included in the offer price,
supports his calculated fair value. Dages's analysis fails, however, because he
ignor·es the serious process problems and conflicts of interest that existed at the
time. Finally, Dages relies on other indications of value that, when appropriately
analyzed, do not support his conclusions.

III.

CRITIQUE OF THE DAGES REPORT'S DCF ANALYSIS
A.

THE DAGES REPORT'S CRITICISM OF THE FEBRUARY 2015
PROJECTIONS IS UNJUSTIFIED

5.

Dages argues that the February 2015 Projections were overly

optimistic because the projected growth rates contained in those projections
exceeded industry growth rates projected by Dell'Oro Group as of December 31,
1

2014. However, as shown in Exhibit 2, Aruba consistently had grown at a rate
exceeding the industry average in the years preceding the Valuation Date. In 2014,
the last fiscal year completed prior to the transaction, Aruba's revenues grew
approximately 21.5%, about double the rate of industry growth. Furthermore, for

1

Dages Report at 39-41.
3
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the fust quarter of calendar 2015, IDC reported enterprise WLAN growth of 3.0%
year over year.

2

Aruba, in contrast, experienced revenue growth of 20.1%

(excluding its OEM business) over this same comparison period. 3 Under these
circumstances, the fact that the February 2015 Projections exceeded the average
industry growth rate does not provide a valid basis to label those projections as
overly optimistic.
6.

Dages also claims that the February 2015 Projections were optimistic

because the WLAN industry was competitive, the WLAN industry was
consolidating, and the Company projected reduced SBC going forward was too
low.

4

Dages's reliance on information predominantly from 2014 causes his

analysis to be outdated and irrelevant as of the valuation date. His failure to
consider data from 2015 is particularly troubling here, given Aruba' s rapid
historical revenue growth rate and its record setting Q2 2015 revenues and profit
margins. Among other things, cutting off his analysis at the end of the 2014 fiscal
year allows Dages to suggest that Aruba' s share of the enterprise WLAN market

2

IDC Press Release, Worldwide WLAN Market Shows Slowed Growth in First
Qua1ter of 2015.
3

"Aruba (excluding its OEM business) was a major bright spot in a weakened
1Q 15, increasing 20.1% year over year .. . " (IDC Press Release, Worldwide WLAN
Market Shows Slowed Growth in First Quarter of2015).
4

Dages Report at 4-5, and 46-47.
4
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was 11.8% (where it stood in Q4 2014), 5 when in fact it had risen to 14% by the
end ofQ12015,6 as shown in the table below :
Aruba's Share ofthe Worldwide WlANMarket
Q~

2013

9.5%

Q4 2013

9.8%

Ql 2014

Q2 2014

12.0%

Q~

11.7%

2014

11.5%

()4 20 14

11.8%

Q l 2015

14.0%

Source: IDC Worldwide Quarterly WLAN Tracker.

7.

Finally, Dages provides no basis to believe that the February 2015

Proje,ctions did not, in fact, reflect Aruba management's and the Board's honest
assessment of the Company's financial and business prospects at the time. For
example, in Aruba's second quarter 2015 earnings call, which took place on
February 26, 2015, Orr stated:
"In conclusion, we continue to be excited about the size and growth
fundamentals for the wireless LAN market, particularly as we move
through the calendar year. Furthermore, our strong operational
execution and ability to leverage our key growth drivers are enabling
us to grow faster than the overall market. We continue to see the
conversion cycle to [sic] towards .llac is the growth driver for many
quarters to come ... " 7
8.

In fact, the February 2015 Projections were adjusted downward from

the October 2014 Projections at the time of the merger discussions to reflect
5

Dages Report at 4.

6

See IDC Press Release, Worldwide WLAN Market Shows Slowed Growth in
First Quarter of2015 ("Aruba's market share jumped to 14.0% compared to 11.8%
in 4Q14 ... ")(cited in Dages Report at ,-r9).

7

Aruba Networks, Inc. FQ2 2015 Earnings Call Transcripts, S&PCapital IQ,
February 26, 2015, p. 5

5

CONTAINS IDGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL

management's and the Board's contemporaneous view of the Company's
prospects, including, but not limited to, the revenue growth rates (including lower
backlog), estimates of profitability, SBC, and others. For example, Galvin
explained "how [the Company' s] revenue projections were created as part of the
three year plan":
" A: Okay. Okay. The formula- I guess you could call it a formulawould be - we have very closely looked at the amount - in terms of
revenue, it would be the bookings incoming and then it would be
the amount of backlog the company had and what the conversion
possibilities of that backlog is. And so we looked very closely at and
tracked what were known as "weeks of backlog," ... so I guess it
would be bookings, as the leading indicator, and then an
evaluation of backlog to say, you know, is the backlog an
appropriate, healthy enough state to where we be·lieve we can get
revenue conversion out of the bookings for the next quarter of two
8
quarters."
9.

Aruba's Board also exhibited confidence in the February 2015

Proje·ctions by providing the revised projections to HP9 and instructing the Board's
financial advisors to rely on those projections when evaluating the proposed
Transaction.
8

10

Galvin Dep. at 27- 28.

9

Johansson Dep . at 201 (HP used February 2015 Projections as "one set of data
points" in its analysis).
10

See generally Reisenberg Dep. at 161-165 (Evercore was provided the February
Proje·ctions as they appeared in the proxy and confirmed that it would base its
financial analysis on these proj ections per Aruba' s request). See Galvin Dep. at
274-275 (the Company sent the February 2015 Projections to Qatalyst), and
Boutros Dep. at 139-141 (Galvin to update Qatalyst's cash flow template for
6
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B.

ANALYSIS OF KEY VARIABLES

1.
10.

Dages Inappropriately ReJects Management's SBC
Projections

The Dages Report rejects the projected level of SBC developed by

Aruba's management and included in the Proxy

11

and adopts instead projected

SBC for Aruba that was included in a financial model prepared by Barclays for

HP.'2
11.

Months before the Valuation Date, Aruba had implemented and

publicly disclosed business plans to reduce the Company's SBC as a percentage of
revenue to bring Aruba's SBC practices more in line with those of its
competitors. 13 Aruba management provided projected SBC to its financial advisors
that reflected these plans to reduce SBC going forward. 14

Dages rejected those

implemented business plans.

revised projections). See also ArubaAA0443864 (Galvin Ex. 42; Boutros Ex.
20)("Post receiving the updated management plan, we will input the new figures in
the cash flow template ... ").
11

Proxy at 57.

12

Dages Report at 47.

13

For example, see Email from Dominic OIT, Subject: Focal Reviews, June 25,
2014 (ArubaAA0054934). Galvin Dep. at 132 - 138; ArubaAA0054933 (Galvin
Ex. 17); 2014 10-K, p. 48.; and Q4 2014 Earnings Call Transcript, August 26,
2014, p. 6.
14

Galvin Dep. at 299-304.
7
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12.

Dages explains that he rejected Aruba' s SBC projections because "I

think it is unreasonable to assume that Aruba would be able to retain and motivate
an employee base sufficient to fuel the projected excess revenue growth while
cutting its SBC percent of sales in half"

15

Dages's stated basis for rejecting

management's SBC forecast is unsupported and factually misplaced.

The

Company' s plans to reduce SBC were implemented well before the February 2015
Proje,c tions were created, 16 and Dages provides no basis to believe that any
potential ramifications from that decision were not incorporated by Aruba
management (who would have a superior understanding of Aruba' s business than
Dages) into the February 2015 Projections themselves. Further, Dages provides no
evidence that reducing SBC as a percentage of revenues in fact would prevent
Aruba from attracting and retaining quality professionals, particularly when
Aruba' s SBC forecasts were designed to bring the Company's SBC practices more
in line with the industry.

17

15

Dages Report at 47.

16

For example, see ArubaAA0054933 (Galvin Ex. 17); and 2014 10-K, p. 48.

17

ArubaAA0054933 Galvin Ex 17 (6/25/ 14 Orr email to Aruba managers
announcing SBC changes; "We have historically been at the very top of all
comparable companies in granting equity to Olllr employees. In years past we' ve
granted more than two times the amount of stock to our employees as compared to
comparable companies in our space.").
8
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13.

Further, the Barclays projections Dages relies on are not relevant in

analyzing Aruba as a standalone company. Explaining Barclays's financial model
of Aruba, and SBC in particular, Hardegree testified as follows:
"Q: Is there a reason why you would pick to expense it [SBC] through
the P&L versus using the dilution factor?
A: Because that's the way they [HPJ were going to run the business.
This whole case has nothing to do with how Aruba would run its
business on its own. This is how does HP think, okay, as a business
unit within HP-- how do we figure out what this is going to be
18
incremental to us. So it's a totally different basis of presentation."
14.

In fact, Hardegree, testified that he had no idea where Barclays's SBC

projections came from.
15.

19

Where the record evidence explains that Barclays's projections

"ha[ ve] nothing to do with how Aruba would run its business on its own" and does
not identify the source or basis of Barclays' s SBC projections or how those
projections were created, it is not sound valuation practice to rely on those
projections in determining a fair value of Aruba as a going concern as of the
Valuation Date.

18

Hardegree Dep. at 208-209, emphasis added.

19

Hardegree Dep. at 254 ("Q .... On the DCF Analysis Aspen Management Case,
there is a line that says 'Stock-based Comp,' and it has various figures. Do you
know where those numbers came from? A. I do not.").
9
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16.

Holding all other factors constant, using SBC projections included in

the Barclays model instead of Aruba management's SBC projections reduces the
fair value of Aruba as determined in my opening report by $5.20 per share.

2.

17.

Dages Inappropriately ReJects the 25°/o Tax Rate that
Aruba Management Provided to the Company's Financial
Advisor and Ignored Valuable Net Operating Losses

Dages also rejects the Company's effective tax rate of 25% as

disclosed in the Proxy and used in Qatalyst' s fairness opinion. 20 Instead, Dages
adopts a tax rate of 30%, which he derived from a February 4, 2015 Excel model
. d"1scovery.21
produced m
18.

Dages's rejection of the 25% tax rate is inappropriate because Aruba

CFO Galvin testified that Aruba management provided Qatalyst with the 25% cash
tax rate figure used in the projections and their rnodel. 22
19.

Dages also ignores the fact that the Company had a net operating loss

("NOL") carryforward that it could use to offset taxable income. Galvin testified
that the Company had NOLs that it could use over the next two to three years (i.e.,
through 2017). 23 In fact, in preparing their valuation work, both Qatalyst and

20

Proxy at 51.

21

ArubaAA005346l.xlsx "Athens Cash Flows'~ (excel file).

22

Galvin Dep. at 296.

23

Galvin Dep. at 156.
10
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Evercore utilized a nominal 4% tax rate for 2015E and 2016E.

24

Dages uses the

30% tax rate across the entire projection period, effectively ignoring the valuable
NOLs.

25

20.

Holding all other factors constant, ignoring Aruba' s NOLs and using a

30% tax rate instead of the 25% tax rate that Aruba management provided to its
financial advisors reduces the fair value of Aruba as determined in my opening
report in the amount of $1.88 per share.

3.
21.

Dages Inappropriately Omits a Transition Period Necessary
to Normalize Earnings Growth

The projection period used in a DCF model, particularly one that

employs a perpetual growth rate in the terminal value calculation, should reflect
the time it takes for the subject company to reach a steady state. Reaching a steady
state of cash flow before calculating a terminal value is well established in
academic literature. One frequently cited valuation text, for example, explains as
follows:
"Note that the only reason one would use a discounted cash flow
method as opposed to a capitalized cash flow model is that the subject
company predicts a period of variability in its earnings stream for
some period of time into the future. The appropriate length of the
forecast period should be until that variability stops; at the point in
24

For example, see Qatalyst Partners, Project Athens, Materials for Discussion,
March 2015, p. 18 (ARUNOOOllO); and Evercore, Project Athens, Suppmting
Valuation Analysis, March 1, 2015, p. 12 (EVERCOREOOOl 0297)
25

Dages Report at 51 and Exhibit 19C.
11
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time that the company expects normalized or level growth, the
26
terminal value is calculated."
22.

Dages relies on a two-stage DCF model, stating "I determine that

modeling a third stage was not sufficiently warranted as there was no investment or
change to the operations that needed to be explicitly modeled."27 Dages is wrong.
23.

At the end of the projection period in the February Projections, the

Company's revenue was projected to grow at 10%. It would be unreasonable to
assume that the Company in its steady state could continue to grow at the 10%
rate. It is well recognized in valuation literature and referenced in the Dages Report
that a likely cap on a company' s long term growth rate is the long term growth rate
of the economy, measured as nominal GDP for companies with domestic
operations. 28 Regardless of whether the long term growth estimate is the 3.5%
used in my report or 2.75% used in the Dages Report, a drop off in revenue growth
rate from 10% to below 4% is inappropriate. This situation, where the year five
growth rate is well above the long term projected nominal GDP growth rate,
requires an intermediate stage in the projections to reduce the growth to a
stabilized long term level.
26

Pratt, Shannon P. and Alina V. Niculita. Va]uing a Business: The Analysis and
Appraisal of Closely Held Companies. 5th Edition. The McGraw-Hill Companies,
2008, pg.219
27

Dages Report 41-42.

28

Dages Report at 48.
12

CONTAINS IDGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL

24.

Dages provides no reasonable basis to believe that m year 2020,

Aruba's revenue growth could be expected to drop from 10% to 2.75%. Dages's
rationale for excluding a third stage to the model is:
" .. . given the fact that the Management Projections are already
projecting growth well in excess of the overall industry, adding a third
stage to the forecast would arguably add more uncertainty to the
growth forecast. Such hyper growth assumptions get more
problematic the further you move away from the three year period that
management forecasted in the ordinary course of business." 29
25.

This rationale provides no reasonable basis for not including a third

26.

First, Dages inappropriately describes the projections as only being

stage.

three years. While the base projection started with the Company's three-year plan,
both Galvin

30

and Boutros

31

testified that Aruba management was involved in

completing the full five year forecast provided in the Proxy and used in the
Qatalyst fairness opinion.
27.

Second, the Company was projecting growth above the industry

average, consistent with its last four years of history and its market leadership
position. It is thus my opinion that it is less risky to gradually reduce the

29

Dages Report at 42.

30

Galvin Dep. at 163-64.

31

Boutros Dep. at 58-59.
13
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projections utilizing a third stage than to project that the Company's revenue
growth rate would fall off of a cliff in year five, as modeled in the Dages Report.
28.

Holding all other factors constant, failing to use a transition period to

normalize revenue growth rate reduces the fair value of Aruba as determined in my
opening report by $1.88 per share.

4.
29.

Dages Inappropriately Selects an 11 °/o WACC

In developing his opinion on Aruba's value of $19.85 per share,

Dages utilized an 11% discount rate. 32 I utilized a 10% discount rate to value
Aruba.

33

The central difference in our calculations relates to the beta utilized in the
4

CAPM modee I calculated Aruba's WACC using a beta generated by weighting
Aruba's company-specific two-year weekly beta with the beta of comparable
WLAN and pure-play networking companies identified by Aruba' s financial

32

Dages Repmt at 58.

33

Marcus Report at 83 .

34

Dages and I agree that the foilowing inputs are proper: (1) use of Aruba's
existing capital structure (1 00% equity) to calculate an appropriate discount rate
such that the WACC is equal to the Company's cost of equity (Marcus Report at
79; Dages Report at 50); (2) use of the CAPM model to calculate the cost of equity
(Dages Report at 51 ; Marcus Report at 80); (3) use of a 2.75% risk free rate (Dages
Report at 52; Marcus Reporrt at 80); and ( 4) use of supply-side equity risk
premiums (Dages: 6.21%; Marcus: 6.19%) (Dages Report at 52; Marcus Report at
80).
14
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advisors. 35 In contrast, Dages presents a range of W ACCs using a variety of
selected betas and then selects an 11% W ACC as the basis for his opinion.
30.

36

Exhibit 18 of the Dages Report summarizes the different betas he

utilized to develop a range of possible discount rates for Aruba. In this Exhibit,
Dages calculates W ACCs for Aruba as well as for a supposed peer group utilizing
three different calculation periods/frequencies (namely, Bloomberg adjusted betas
that were calculated on a two-year weekly, five-year weekly, and five-year
monthly basis). Dages' s approach to selecting betas is flawed for several reasons.
31.

First, Dages inappropriately includes five-year betas, which merely

serve to provide higher estimates of beta (causing the valuation to be depressed).
Use of five year betas is inappropriate here because they are not representative of
the Company's future risk as of the valuation date. As described in the Marcus
Report and summarized here, the Company's growth, market success, and financial
performance changed dramatically over the five years preceding the transaction,
rendering the use of a beta calculated over a five-year period irrelevant for
purposes of estimating Aruba' s value as of May 18, 2015.

37

Dages argues for a

variance from his normal practice of using 2-year weekly returns because "in

35

Marcus Repmt at 80-83.

36

Dages Report at 57-58 and Dages Report Exhibit 18.

37

Marcus Report at 83.
15
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certain cases, a historical 2 year measurement window is distorted in a way as to
not be representative of the risk of the business moving forward (e.g., a major
acquisition or divestiture is announced)."

38

However, this argument actually

describes why a shorter calculation period is superior to a longer calculation period
in this situation where Aruba has changed so dramatically over the preceding five
years. As explained in Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples (Fifth Edition)
(identified as "relied upon" by Dages): "[I]f the business characteristics change
during the sampling period (e.g., major divestiture or acquisition, financial distress,
cancellation of a significant contract), it may be more appropriate to use a shorter
sampling period." 39
32.

Not only is Dages' s use of a five-year period to calculate Aruba' s beta

inappropriate, but his use of both five-year weekly and five-year monthly betas
artificially inflates his WACC calculation.
weekly and monthly betas are similar.

40

By their nature, Aruba' s five-year
Thus, by including both, Dages

overweights the five-year period in his calculations. Using WACC estimates based
on Aruba's adjusted two-year weekly and five-year monthly betas as reported in

38

Dages Rep01t at 54.

39

Pratt, Shannon P., and Grabowski, Roger J., Cost of Capital: Applications and
Examples Fifth Edition: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (2014), p. 208.
40

Aruba' s five-year weekly adjusted beta is 1.41 and its five-year monthly
adjusted beta is 1.46. Dages Report, Exhibit 18.
16
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Exhibit 18 of the Dages Report, the median (and mean) WACC for Aruba is
9.99%.
33.

Dages's use of Bloomberg adjusted betas was also improper.

Bloomberg calculates adjusted betas by weighting the company's observed beta by
two-thirds and the market beta (1 .0) by one-third.
34.

Dages's use of the Bloomberg adjusted betas is not justified. As New

York University Corporate Finance Professor Aswath Damodaran explained:
"Why adjust betas towards one? The rationale can be traced to studies
that indicate that, over time, there is a tendency on the part of betas of
all companies to move towards one. Intuitively, this should not be
surprising. Firms that survive in the market tend to increase in size
over time, become more diversified and have more assets in place,
producing cash flows. All of these factors should push betas towards
one.
Using constant weights to estimate these betas, however, does not
make sense. The speed with which betas converge on one should vary
across companies. Firms that tend to diversify more should see their
betas converge on one far faster than firms which stay focused in one
business. While conceding the fact that betas for most firms will move
towards one over time, we would argue that there is no need to adjust
regression betas towards one right now to reflect this tendency.
Instead, the betas can change over time, in a valuation or a project
analysis, to approach one over time." 41
35.

Given that Aruba' s focus was almost entirely on the WLAN market

combined with the fact that the raw beta reflects the market's estimates at the time

41

Damodaran, Aswath, "Estimating Risk Parameters," Stern School of Business, p.
12.
17
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of the valuation, it is my opinion that the adjusted betas that Dages used are
inappropriate in the case of Aruba.
36.

Holding all other factors constant, using an 11% discount rate instead

of the 10% W ACC I calculated reduces the fair value of Aruba as determined in
my opening report by $4.23 per share.
5.
37.

Dages Selects an Unreasonably Low Terminal Value
Perpetuity Growth Rate

The Dages Report book ends the stable growth rate in the terminal

year to be in between the rate of inflation and the nominal United States GDP
growth rate, presenting a range of 2.25% (median long-term inflation rate) to
4.75% (the high end of the range for his estimated nominal GDP growth rate).

42

Relying on a single decision from this Court, without any explanation reconciling
the similarities and differences between the subject companies at issue, Dages
selects the risk-free rate, 2.75%, for his long-term growth rate.
38.

Dages's selection of his perpetuity growth rate does not take into

account the expected long-tetm growth rate of the economy as suggested by
academics and practitioners alike. For example, consider the following:

"Growth rate: Few companies can be expected to grow faster than the
economy for long periods. The best estimate is probably the expected

42

Dages Report at 49 (Dages also presents an estimate ofGDP of 4.2%).
18
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long-term rate of consumption growth for the industry's products, plus
inflation. " 43
"As a point of reference, real (before inflation) gross domestic product
has grown by about 3-3.5 percent per year since the 1920s. Since the
discount rate and cash flow assumptions are in nominal terms (i.e.,
they include inflation), the growth rate also must be nominal.
Therefore, a long-term growth rate would include the long-term
inflation rate forecast as well as any real growth in earnings. (If longterm inflation were expected to be 3 percent and if the real growth in
earnings of a company were expected to be 3 percent, then this longterm rate would be 6 percent.)" 44
39.

A simple average of Dages's growth rate book ends ( 4.75% and

2.25%) yields a long-term growth rate of3.5% (3.36% using the average of the two
GOP growth rates). Given Aruba's historical and projected performance, its
growing market share, and its industry leadership position, a long term growth rate
at the higher end of that range of between 3.5% and 4.75o/o would be a reasonable
expectation for the Company. Selecting a rate of 2.75% inappropriately penalizes
Aruba' s value.
40.

Holding all other factors constant, Dages' s use of a 2.75% perpetuity

growth rate has the effect of reducing the fair value as determined in my opening
report by $1.92 per share.

43

Koller, Tim, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels, Valuation - Measuring and
Managing the Value of Companies, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Fifth Edition, 2010,
p. 214.
44

Hitchner, James R., Financial Valuation- Applications and Models, John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., Second Edition, 2006, pp. 309-310.
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C.

CONCLUSION ON THE CRITIQUE OF THE DAGES REPORT'S DCF
ANALYSIS

41.

The

five

maJor

differences

discussed

above

((i)

changing

management's projection of SBC; (ii) changing management's projected tax rate;
(iii) utilizing a two-stage DCF model as opposed to a three-stage model; (iv) using
an inflated WACC; and (v) using a lower terminal year growth rate) account for all
but $0.15 45 of the: difference in the valuations of Aruba as calculated in the Dages
Rep011 and the Marcus Report.
42.

Dages's valuation of Aruba is well below the Company's own

expectations of value (see my initial report), well below the median analyst price
targets (see Exhibit 1), below the low end of the range of the DCF analyses
performed by the three financial advisors involved with the transaction (even if
such analyses are not corrected for their inappropriate assumptions), and well
below Aruba's own $25.00 per share ceiling on its stock repurchase program.

45

The remaining difference between the DCF values reported in the Dages Report
and Marcus Report results from a slight difference in the share count used ($0.05)
and most likely rounding differences in attempting to replicate the Dages DCF
($0.10).
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43.

The chart below demonstrates the cumulative impact of each of the

five key differences discussed above, and provides a reconciliation of the fair value
provided in the Dages Report to the fair value determined by my DCF valuation.

46

$35.00
S32.57
$30.00

S25.00

$20.00

$15.00

$10.00

S5.00

S-

Marcus DCF
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Tax Rate
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Impact of II%
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CRITIQUE OF THE DAGES REPORT'S OTHER INDICATIONS OF
VALUE
A.

THE MERGER PRICE

44.

Dages opines that "[o ]ne potential indicator of fair value is the merger

price itself, particularly in situations where the target company was acquired in an

46

The incremental impact of each of the key differences listed in the following
chart do not necessarily equal the individual impact of adjusting each factor
separately (identified above) because the incremental impact depends on the order
in which adj ustments are made. The following chart presents these differences in
what I believe are the most logical order.
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arms' length transaction subject to a robust sales process." 47 But whether or not a
transaction completed as a result of a robust sales process or on an ann's length
basis (free of conflicts) can provide any indication of fair value is in·elevant here.
Based on my analysis of the record, the sales process did not serve as a tool for
price discovery, nor was it free of conflicts of interest.
1.

45.

The Sales Process Did Not Lead to Price Discovery

Aruba was not for sale at the time it received an unsolicited approach

from HP. Upon the initiation of discussions with HP, Aruba's hired Qatalyst as its
investment banker. Qatalyst had limited discussions with a small group of five
potential strategic buyers in the fall of 2014 and later with a sixth in January 2016.
The process, however, did not provide any price discovery regarding Aruba's value
other than the price negotiated with HP. Ther,e are a number of reasons why the
merger price is an unreliable indication of Aruba' s fair value under the facts here.
46.

First, the price negotiated with HP cannot be relied upon as a market

check of Aruba's value. HP offered what it was willing to pay, but did so with a
belief that there was not any competition. As described by Johansson:
"[F]rom the time that Antonio reached out to Dom, at least from our
perspective, it was a very friendly discussion. It was - they were not

47

Dages Report at 23.
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running a sales process. There was no posturing about trying to pin us
against someone else. "48
47.

The lack of any actual or even perceived competition did not provide

the auction-like environment viewed by many, including Aruba, as the best
environment to maximize price. 49 And for its part, beyond the obvious incentive to
minimize its purchase price, HP had the additional concern that it not be perceived
as overpaying given that its acquisition of Aruba was its first major acquisition
since it was forced to write-off $8.8 billion approximately 11 months after
acquiring Autonomy in December 2011. 50 Moreover, Johansson testified that the
price HP was willing to pay was based on what Aruba was worth to HP, and not on
any analysis of what Aruba was worth as a going concem on a standalone basis. 51
Therefore, reliance upon HP's purchase price of Aruba as an indication of fair
value is inappropriate.

48

Johansson Dep. at 112.

49

For instance, at least as early as September 22, 2014, Aruba discussed the need
to have a "stalking horse" involved in order to make the process more competitive.
Email from Aaron Bean to Dominic Orr et al., Subject: News Observations,
September 22, 2014 (ARUN005500).
50

Johansson Dep. at 128; Whitman Dep. at 102 ("I remember pointing out to him
that this was the first deal post the Autonomy acquisition and that there was going
to be heightened inspection, heightened thoughtfulness about the first deal post
Autonomy, and that, you know, he was going to feel that pressure in terms of the
pace at which we moved and the amount of board oversight and things like that.");
ARUN009606 (Orr Ex. 46).

51

Johansson Dep. at 29, 38.
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48.

Second, the process undertaken by Qatalyst did not provide any price

discovery. None of the limited group that Qatalyst contacted 52 ever got to the
position of discussing price because they were not interested in Aruba for strategic
reasons. Boutros testified that "[i]t was very clear that none of them had any
interest in an acquisition. It wasn't a close calL It was unequivocally no. No
interest. This is not a company we' re interested in buying or owning."53 And
because of this lack of strategic interest, Boutros's testimony confirmed that this
limited reach-out did not provide any means of price discovery:
"A. When someone is really interested strategically in an asset but
they struggle with the price, they tell you that. When you call people
and they say, 'This is really not something we want to own because
it's not on our strategic roadmap and this is not a company that
belongs in our company,' it has nothing to do with price. Price

doesn't even come up in the equation.
Q. Okay.

52

It should also be noted that while Dages also describes Orr reaching out to
Google Access and Dell (Dages Report at 19), the Company apparently did not
consider this effort by Orr to be significant as it was not disclosed in the Proxy.
Under these circumstances, Orr's contacts should not be considered part of a
market check. And, in any event, Orr testified that both Google Access and Dell like the others contacted by Qatalyst - were not interested in Aruba for strategic
reasons. Orr Dep. at 175-177 (Google Access told Orr that it did not "have interest
to attack the general market" and therefore did "not have interest in your
company"; after meeting with Dell, Orr' s "best judgment" was that Dell would be
"much more focused on the storage business" and thus would not have interest in a
networking acquisition).
53

Boutros Dep. at 219.
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A. And that was the case with all [of} these potential acquirers

when we spoke with them. " 54
49.

Third, the small number of potential buyers contacted also ratses

questions regarding the adequacy of the efforts to solicit alternative bidders.
Qatalyst informed the Aruba Board that the five potential buyers it was petmitted
to contact in the fall of 2014 likely would not be interested in an acquisition,5 5 and
there is indication in the record that other potentially interested parties were not
56

contacted.
50.

If the potential buyers contacted had no interest in Aruba for strategic

reasons and never provided a price indication as a result, the mere fact that they
were contacted does not provide any suppmi for price discovery.
51.

Finally, all financial sponsors were eliminated from the process.

Regardless of the price limitations in the LBO model as described by Dages, once
the targeted strategic buyers declined for strategic reasons, there was no reason to
exclude potentia[ financial sponsors from the process in order to gain price

54

Boutros Dep. at 220 (emphasis added).

55

Boutros Dep. at 75-76. See also Boutros Dep. at 99-100; and 219.

56

For example, in a March 4, 2015 email from Hans Vestberg of Ericsson (a
potential strategic buyer) to Quattrone, be wrote "Congratulations to [sic] the deal,
we were a little puzzled why you did not include us in the process, or maybe you
did?', (Email from Hans Vestberg to Frank Quattrone, "RE: Qatalyst Advises
Aruba Networks on Proposed $3.0 Billion Sale to HP," March 4, 2015
(QP00011637)).
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discovery or generate competition to the HP offer.

In fact, Qatalyst was

contemporaneously advising Riverbed Technology, Inc. ("Riverbed") in its sale to
private equity investors Thoma Bravo LLC ("Thoma Bravo") and the Ontario
Teachers' Plan Board ("Ontario Teachers") in a transaction that both Qatalyst and
Evercore included in their comparable transaction analyses. 57 Excluding financial
sponsors from the entire sales process, particularly in light of the process's failure
to generate any interest in Aruba, contributed to the process's failure to generate
any price discovery.
52.

Because the process in this situation never provided any pnce

discovery, the results of the process provide no information about Aruba's value
other than what HP was willing to pay. Given these circumstances, it would be
inappropriate to rely on the price negotiated between Aruba and HP as an
indication of Aruba's true intrinsic value.

57

On December 15, 2014, Thoma Bravo and Ontario Teachers offered to acquire
Riverbed in a transaction valued at $3.4 billion. Riverbed provided solutions for
fundamental problems associated with performance across WANs. Information
discussing the Riverbed transaction was obtained from FactSet, unless otherwise
noted.
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2.
53.

Conflicts of Interest

Dages states that "I have seen no evidence indicating that the

transaction was not done at arms' length."

58

Dages ignores myriad conflicts of

interest that existed.

(a)
54.

Qatalyst Conflicts

From the outset, Aruba recognized that Qatalyst had a vested financial

interest in getting the transaction done with HP, regardless of whether the deal was
9

in the best interest of the Company. 5 In fact, there is evidence that Aruba' s Vice
President of Human Resources believed that Qatalyst wanted Aruba to close a deal
with HP to the exclusion of other potential acquirers.
55.

60

Qatalyst also had a conflict unique to HP specifically, arising from its

prior representation of Autonomy. This conflict was exacerbated when Whitman
refused to negotiate with Qatalyst and Aruba acceded to Whitman' s wishes and

58

Dages Report at 23.

59

Email from Dominic Orr to Ava Hahn, Subject: Re: One Page Summary,
September 25, 2014 (ARUN001504) ("I want to highlight there is a subtle but
important split in objectives between Qatalyst and Aruba .. . viz. they only have
one objective in mind - sell aruba at the highest premium but sell it! We have two
additional objectives:
that, other than financials, the combination makes
substantial sense (we need this to continue to motivate our staff), and that the
organization and structure is set up for success and maintaining fun and pride and
minimize large company pain.").
60

Email from Aaron Bean to Dominic Orr et al., Subject: News Observations,
September 22, 2014 (ARUN005500).
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brought in Evercore as a second investment banker. My opening rep01t details
extensive facts in the record documenting this conflict, including Whitman 's
refusal to negotiate with Qatalyst, Quattrone's r,epeated efforts to appease Whitman
and protect the Qatalyst brand (which continued after the closing), and Aruba's
efforts to clear Evercore' s retention with Whitman in order to negotiate a
transaction. 61 I will not repeat all of that evidence here, but instead incorporate it
by reference. Dages ignores this evidence entirely. Throughout the course of my
career, I have never seen a situation where the opposing side of a transaction had
such jnfluence over the other side's choice of an investment banker.

(b)
56.

Evercore Conflicts

Dages also ignores evidence indicating conflicts within Evercore,

which are also highlighted in my opening report. 62 Evercore was motivated to take
a steeply discounted advisory fee just to get its name on a transaction between HP
and Aruba "to establish a presence in tech"63 and internally was looking to position

61

Marcus Rep011 at 50-57.

62

Marcus Report at 58-61 .

63

Email from Ava Hahn, January 24, 2015 (ARUN004920 at ARUN004921).
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itself to get future business from HP. 64 Again, I will not repeat all of that record
evidence here, but incorporate it by reference.
57.

This evidence, set forth at length m my openmg report, provides

substantial reason to doubt that Evercore operated free of any extraneous
considerations in negotiating against HP for a price that reflected Atuba' s fair
value. The importance to Evercore of securing a role in the Aruba/HP deal both in
terms of solidifying the bank's presence in the tech sector and in terms of allowing
it to build a potentially lucrative future relationship with HP and the importance to
Francis personally to establish himself at his new employer all present conflicts to
Evercore/Francis that Dages ignored.

(c)
58.

Orr Conflicts

Dages also ignores conflicts relating to CEO On. On October 2,

2014, Aruba and HP signed a confidentiality agreement that prevented HP from
talking to Aruba employees about positions in the new company. The record
indicates that HP and Orr began discussions as early as September 2014 and
continued to have such discussions after the confidentiality agreement was signed.
It was not until February 18, 2015 when the Aruba Board agreed to amend the
64

Email from Naveen Nataraj to Stuart Francis, Subject: Re: Evercore meeting at
MWC/CEO
Dinner
at
Can
Roca,
February
21,
2015
(EVERCORE00007343)(That's HUGE! Meg is going to be very active. Am
almost sure Lenovo will make a bid for the PC business post separation. Would be
a great new relationship ... ")
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confidentiality agreement that HP was permitted to talk to Aruba employees about
employment in the newly combined business.
59.

Orr's discussions of his potential role as head of the combined Aruba

and HP business while purportedly negotiating on behalf of the Company posed a
clear conflict of interest. The fact that Orr did not retire, as the Dages Report
suggests he was poised to do, makes clear how significant this conflict was, as the
lure of a position with the post-closing Aruba was strong enough to derail
retirement plans that (in Dages's view) were assured to come to fruition absent a
transaction.
60.

The collective conflicts of interest among Qatalyst, Evercore, and Orr

are sufficient to call into doubt whether the deal was done to maximize the ultimate
share price paid to existing shareholders, therefore undermining Dages's
assumption that the transaction was negotiated at arms' length.
B.

ANALYST PRICE TARGETS

61.

The Dages Report refers to security analysts PTs as being another

indicator of Aruba's value. Dages centers his analysis on the Bloomberg article
that reported the rumor that HP might be acquiring Aruba. Specifically, the Dages
Report notes that the security analysts' PTs ranged from $19.00 to $29.00 per share
(medjan of $22.00) prior to the Bloomberg report and ranged from $20.00 to
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$34.00 per share (median of $26.00) after the Bloomberg report. 65 The Dages
Report makes two fundamental errors in its analysis of security analysts PTs,
which leads it to inappropriately rely on the analyst PTs as support for it fair value
estimate.
62.

First, Dages states that the Bloomberg article reporting the rumor of

Aruba being acquired by HP came out on February 27, 2015. This is incorrect. As
noted in both the Marcus Report and the Proxy, the Bloomberg article was reported
on February 25, 2015. 66 This error in the Dages Report is significant because after
the market closed on February 26, 2015, Aruba reported its record Q2 2015
earnings. 67 Fallowing the Company's Q2 2015 earnings release, many analysts
updated their Pis based not on the rumor of an acquisition as implied in the Dages
Report, but based on the Company' s operating metrics (see Exhibit 1).
63.

Further, the security analysts' Pis are by definition the value for a

minority share of the Company and are generally based on a twelve month outlook,
not the fair value of the Company at the time of the report. If the median PT of
$26.00 is discounted by 10% for a one-year period, and a 20% premium is added to

65

Dages Report at 28.

66

Proxy at 45; Marcus Report at 26.

67

Proxy at 45; Marcus Report at 25-26.
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the result in order to eliminate the inherent minority interest discount, the resulting
fair value is $28.36 per share.
64.

When viewed properly, the Dages Report's analysis of security

analysts' PTs fails to support Dages's opinion on the fair value of Aruba.

C.

FINANCIAL ADVISORS' DCF VALUATIONS

65.

The Dages Report states that the valuation ranges provided by the

three investment banking firms involved in the transaction support his $19.85 per
share estimate of fair value. He is wrong.
66.

Dages derived his $19.85 per share value based on a DCF. In relying

on Qatalyst, Evercore and Barclays, it is not until Dages adds in all other valuation
methodology ranges used by these advisors (many based on "comparable
companies or precedent transactions" that are not truly comparable) that his
analysis provides a range that at its lowest end is slightly below his estimate of fair
value. In order to make an appropriate comparison, Dages should only use DCF
values to support his $19.85 per share DCF value.
67.

Now focusing solely on DCF valuations, Dages calculated Aruba's

WACC at 11.0%. In regards to Qatalyst, Dages relies on Qatalyst's presentation to
the Aruba Board when it provided its fairness opinion.68 In perfmming its DCF

68

Dages Report at 29 c1tmg "Qatalyst Partners, Project Athens, Materials for
Discussion," March 2015 (ARUN000093-130).
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sensitivity analysis, Qatalyst used discount rates of 10.50%~ 12.25% and 14.00%.69
Even by Dages's own calculation, the 12.25% and 14.00% discount rates are too
high for Aruba. Thus, using Qatalyst's 10.50o/o discount rate (being the closest to
Dages's 11 %), Qatalyst presented a range of DCF values of $23.23 to $30.02 per
share. This range does not support Dages's $19.85 per share opinion.
68.

In relying on Evercore to support his $19.85 DCF value, Dages used

materials prepared by Evercore dated March 1, 2015. 70 In performing its DCF
sensitivity analysis, Evercore used discount rates ranging from 11.0% to 13%.71
Focusing on Evercore's 11.0%> discount rate as it is the same as Dages's discount
rate, Evercore presented values of $26.65 to $29.78 per share based on a PGR
method of determining the terminal value. Evercore also presented values of
$26.13 to $29.75 per share based on an EBITDA multiple to calculate the terminal
value. These ranges do not support Dages's $19.85 per share opinion.

69

Qatalyst Partners, Project Athens, Materials for Discussion, March 2015, pp. 2425 (ARUN000093-130).

70

Dages Report at 31 citing "Project Athens Supporting Valuation Analysis,"
March 1, 2015 (EVERCORE00011411-32).

71

Project Athens Supporting Valuation Analysis, March 1, 2015, p. 12
(EVERCORE00011411-32).
33

CONTAINS IDGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL

69.

Dages also relied on Barclays to support his $19.85 DCF value and in

so doing, used Barclays February 27, 2015 board materials.

72

In performing its

DCF sensitivity analysis, Barclays used discount rates ranging from 11.0% to
13%.73 Focusing on Barclays' 11.0% discount rate as it is the same as Dages's
discount rate, Barclays presented values of $29.24 to $33.64 per share based on an
EBITDA multiple to calculate the terminal value. This range does not support
Dages's $19.85 per share opinion.
70.

As a final note and as discussed above, each of these financial

advisors faced myriad conflicts that render rdiance on their DCF calculations
inappropriate. Dages's analysis ignores these conflicts of interest entirely.
D.

COMPARABLE COMPANY ANALYSIS

71.

The group of seven

74

companies Dages selected is not sufficiently

comparable to render his comparable compames analysis meaningful. The
companies identified by Dages can be broken down into three categories: WLAN
companies (including Ruckus Wireless, Inc. and Ubiquiti Networks, [nc.), PurePlay Networking companies (including F5 Networks, Inc.), and Traditional

72

Dages Repmt at 32 citing " Project Aspen Board Materials," Febtuary 27, 2015
(ArubaAA0519962).

73

Project Aspen Board Materials, February 27, 2015, p. 10 (ArubaAA0519975).

74

Ultimately, because Aerohive Networks, Inc. did not have meaningful trading
multiples, Dages relied on six companies to make his assessment of value.
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Networking companies (including Cisco Systems, Inc., Brocade Communications
Systems, and Juniper Networks, Inc.).
72.

The comparability for valuation purposes of each of these companies

to Aruba is weak Although I consider the group of WLAN companies to be the
most comparable to Aruba, none of the WLAN companies selected by Dages have
a product line as robust as Aruba' s. Consider, for example, the following table
from my initial report which indicates what companies are considered leaders in
various WLAN segments:
Select Competitive Benchmarking
-

Indicates a Leader

SMBGIM
Wireless Fie ld Expertise
Wi red Held E.tpcrtise
Fnterp.-ise GTM
Ve•·tical Applications
Wireless Security
Str ategic lows try Par tnership>
BYOD Solution
Wireless Controller/ Features
Fnte•·p ·ise Access Point
Wired S\\itc hing
Networ k Management Sofn,are
Policy Management
Tele"o•·ker/ Remote Access Point
Controller-less Access Point
Clou~managed nehwrking

HP

II

Aruba

II

Cisco

II

Ruckus

II

Ubiquiti

II Aerohive I

-------- ----------

Source: P roject Aspen, TRB Approval to Ne!,.:>tiate (ATN), Noven1ber 2014, p . 8 (AmbaAA0243444) .

73.

Note that while Aruba is labeled a leader in 13 of 16 categories, the

WLAN companies selected by Dages are only leaders in 4 in the case of Aerohive,
and 2 in the case of Ruckus and Ubiquiti.
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74.

The Company's leadership in these categories provided Aruba

unmatched scalability in the industry. As HP's Antonio Neri noted in explaining
why HP wanted to buy Aruba, "aside from Aruba, there is no other player in the
market who can challenge them [Cisco] at scale in Campus (small fragmented
player)." 75
75.

Furthermore, the Forrester WAVE™ for WLAN Solutions report,

cited in the Marcus Report, also placed Aruba in the "Leaders" category when
assessing the Company on criteria such as scalability, security, market presence
and strategy, among others.76 In addition, Gartner's 2015 Magic Quadrant report
for wired and Wireless LAN positioned the Company in the "Leaders" category, a
position rivaled only by Cisco and HP. These industry reports demonstrate their
agreement with Aruba's market leadership position in numerous areas. In this case
the analysis comparing Aruba to smaller, niche WLAN companies, such as those
selected by Dages, provides limited utility in the determination of Aruba's fair
value.
76.

Although these compames do have some things in common with

Aruba, they are in very different positions in the marketplace and in their maturity.
75

Email from Antonio Neri, "FW: Review ASPEN Business Plan/Operating
Model with Antonio," October 25,2014 (ArubaAA0500561 -63).

76

http://news.arubanetworks.com/press-rdease/aruba-networks-named-leaderwireless-lan-solutions-20 14-evaluation-independent-researc.
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Interestingly, utilizing all of Dages's data and utilizing the median EBITDA
multiple for just these WLAN companies, which are arguably the closest
comparisons of Dages's group, and including a 20% premium to eliminate the
minority interest discount inherent in Dages's analysis, implies a materially higher
valuation for Aruba ranging from $23.70 - $ 46.30 per share (as compared to
$11.55 to $21.75 per share in the Dages Report, Exhibit 8) as shown in the
following table: 77
EV / EBITDA
LT\1

2015E

2016E

Ruckus
Ubiquiti
Aero hive

34.4lx
11.34x

43.19x
11.73x

29.40x
10.78x

Median
Mean

22.88x
22.88x

27.46x
27.46x

20.09x
20.09x

Amba Operating Figures
Implied Enterprise Value
Net Debt
li11plied Equity Value
Premium to Eliminate Minority Interest
Shares Outstanding
Equity Value per Share

80.8 $ 132.5 $ 193.5
1,848.3
3,638.5
3,888.2
291.0
291.0
291.0
2,139.3
3,929.5
4,179.2
20.00/o
20.0%
20.0%
$ 2,567.2 $ 4,715.3 $ 5,015.1
108.32
108.32
108.32
$ 23.70 $ 43.53 $ 46.30
$

Note: (millions, except per share values).

77

Dages calculates his "Comparable Company Valuation," presented as Exhibit 8
of the Dages Report, using 108.32MM outstanding shares. He does not explain the
basis for his calculation. If Dages's 108.32MM figure is replaced with the
120.9MM fully diluted shares outstanding calculated in the Marcus Report, the
LTM, 2015E and 2016E per share values would be $21.24, $39.01, and $41.49,
respe,ctively.
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77.

The second category of comparable companies selected by Dages was

Pure-·Play networking companies, which only included F5 Networks ("F5").
Again, this company's comparability to Aruba is limited. F5 primarily sells
application delivery networking products that optimize the performance of an
existing network's systems. Aruba does sell similar products, such as the Aruba
7200 Series Mobility Controllers that optimize mobile application delivery, but
these products are one of three major components Aruba sells.78
78.

In addition, F5 Networks was in a different stage of development than

Aruba. For example, F5's revenues were growing at a slower rate than Aruba's,
increasing at a compound annual rate of 15% over the period 2012-2014. Aruba's
revenues grew approximately 23% over that same period, a rate nearly 50% higher
than F5's. It is my opinion that F5 is not sufficiently comparable to Aruba for the
purposes of a comparable company valuation. The table below summarizes
revenue growth rates for F5 and other companies analyzed in further detail below:

78

http://www.arubanetworks.com/products/networking/controllers/7200-series/;
Aruba Networks [nc, Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year ended July 31,2014, p.4.
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Aruba Networks

2012
300/o

Gnmth Rate
2013
2014
21%
16%

79%
79%
110%

-9%
23%
50%

78%
24%
28%

42%
400/o
59%

200/o
38%
13%
32%

8%
87%
2%
18%

17%
62%
15%
27%

15%
61%
100/o
25%

7%
-2%
4%

6%
7%
-I%

-3%
-1%
-I%

3%
1%
1%

C/\GR(I)
23%

WLANVendors
Ubiquiti
Ruckus Wireless
Aero hive

Pure Play Networking
F5 Networks
Arista Networks
Radware
A I 0 Networks

Tracitional Networking
Cisco
Juniper
Brocade

Note: ( l) Represents the compound annual growth rate over the 3 year period 2011-2014.
Source: FactSet.

79.

The Dages Report also ignores the other Pure-Play compames

identified by the three financial advisors in the transaction (Arista Networks,
Radware, and AlO Networks) and by doing so eliminated many of the highest
multiple companies used in the bankers' valuation work.
80.

The final group of companies selected by Dages in his comparable

company valuation was Traditional Networking companies. This includes Cisco
Systems, Inc., Brocade Communications Systems, and Juniper Networks, Inc.
These companies primarily focused on providing products and solutions for the
more traditional wired networks, with products such as switches and routers. I do
not consider these three companies to be comparable because the traditional
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networking market was more mature than the fast growing WLAN market. This is
clear when looking at revenue growth rates. Over the period 2012-2014, the three
companies selected by Dages saw compound annual revenue growth ranging from
1%-3%, while Aruba's revenues which grew at a rate of 23%. In addition, these
three companies all employed debt in their capital structure, with debt to equity
ratios ranging from 12%-15%. Aruba, on the other hand, had zero debt in its
capital structure.
81 .

These compames, which are mature established businesses in the

traditional networking market, have little in common with Aruba, but for the fact
that a small fraction of these companies' current business was in the WLAN
industry. In 2014 for example, Cisco's wireless segment had revenues of $2.3
79

billion out of a total of$47.1 billion. Cisco is in a league of its own with a market
capitalization of approximately $152 billion at the time of the merger. The breadth
of its business and markets that it serves lead to risks in areas not experienced by
Aruba.
82.

Brocade is a significant player in the fiber channel storage area

networking ("SAN") business. The growth of cloud-based infrastructure and the
shift of networking dollars to the cloud potentially threatens Brocade's cash-cow

79

Cisco Systems Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended July 26, 2014, p. 120.
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SAN business. 80 Despite a threat to its primary cash generating business unit,
Brocade remained "committed to returning >60% of its FCF [free cash flow] to
shareholders via buybacks/dividends."

81

It is clear that Brocade is a much more

established company than Aruba. While Aruba was buying back stock to offset the
dilutive effects of SBC 82 , I have not seen any evidence that the Company was
going to be paying cash dividends to stockholders. As of the valuation date, the
Company was in the process of shifting from a revenue-focused firm to increasing
its profitability83 , clearly putting it in a different phase of the business life cycle
than Brocade. As such, Brocade is not a reasonable company to be used in valuing
Aruba.
83.

Juniper is an established supplier of routers and switches for both

internet service providers and enterprise network customers. Similar to Brocade,
Juniper has a history of returning cash to shareholders in the form of dividends to
stockholders, in addition to substantial stock buybacks. In 2015, cash dividend
payments were expected to total more than $40 million per quarter. 84 Again, while
80

Wedbush Securities, "Brocade Communications (BRCD), IP Roars Ahead While
SAN Stumbles, Maintain Neutral," May 2 1, 2015, p. 2.

81

RBC Capital Markets, "Brocade Communications, Mixed results but giving
more cash back," May 2, 2015, p. 1.

82

See Galvin Dep. at 130.

83

See Marcus Report at 18-21 and material cited therein.

84

Juniper Networks, Inc., Form 10-Q for the Quarter ended March 31, 2015, p. 6.
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Aruba was buying back stock, I have not seen any evidence to suggest that the
Company was going to be paying cash dividends to stockholders. As such, it is
clear that Juniper is in a different phase of the business life cycle than Aruba and,
therefore, is not a reasonable company to be used in valuing Aruba.
84.

The EV/EBITDA multiple of these three (Cisco, Brocade and Juniper)

mature businesses are the lowest three used by Dages. Removing them from his
analysis, utilizing all of Dages's data, and including a 20% premium to eliminate
the minority interest discount inherent in Dages's analysis yields a materially
higher estimate of value, with estimates ranging from $16.14 to $46.30 per share
(as compared to $11.55 to $21.75 per share in the Dages Report, Exhibit 8) as
shown in the following table: 85

85

Again, Dages uses 108.32MM shares outstanding in his calculation. Dages
Report, Exhibit 9. Using 120.9MM fully diluted shares outstanding as calculated
in the Marcus Report, the LTM, 2015E and 2016E per share values would be
$14.46, $20.67, and $41.49, respectively.
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EV / EBITDA
LTl\1
20l5E
20l6E
34.4lx
43.19x
29.40x
11.34x
11.73x
10.78x

Ruckus
Ubiquiti
Aero hive
FS Networks
Median
Mean
A mba Operating Figures
Implied Enterprise Value
Net Debt
lnnplied Equity Value
Premium to Eliminate Minority Interest
Shares Outstanding
Equity Value per Share

14.43x

13.52x

14.43x
20.06x

13.52x
22.8lx

20.09x
20.09x

$

80.8 $ 132.5 $ 193.5
1,165.9
1,791.4
3,888.2
29 1.0
291.0
291.0
1,456.9
2,082.4
4,179.2
20.(Yl/o
20.0%
20.0%
$ I ,748.3 $2,498.9 $5,015.1
108.32
108.32
108.32
$ 16.14 $ 23.07 $ 46.30

Note: (millions, except per share values).

85.

In addition to the factors showing the weakness of the comparability,

the analysis focuses solely on Enterprise Value to EBITDA multiples while
ignoring an Enterprise Value to Revenues multiple.

While Aruba itself was

transitioning from a focus on revenues to a focus on profits, that transformation
had not been completed. The Q1 2015 market response to a less than 1o/o potential
miss in its revenue guidance caused a 13.6% stock drop, which demonstrates the
market's continued focus of Aruba's revenues. Furthermore, other WLAN
companies used in the Dages comparable companies, none of which had Aruba's
market leadership position or scale, would likely have been evaluated, in part,
based on revenue multiples. Therefore, relying solely on EBITDA multiples for
comparing to those companies is misleading.
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86.

Using the companies shown in the previous table as well as the

Enterprise Value-to-Revenue multiples presented in the Marcus Report (since
Dages did not compute revenue multiples) 86 , including a 20% premium to
eliminate the minority interest discount inherent in Dages's analysis, but using all
of Dages's other data, yields values that are $30.62, $31.67 and $32.55 per share
based on LTM, and estimated 2015 and 2016 revenues, respectively, as set fmth in
the following table: 87
LThl

E\' /Rcu~ nuc
2015E

2016E

Ruckus
Ubiquiti
Aero hive
FSNetworks

2.32x
3.77x
1.79x
4L62x

2.09x
3.80x
1.62x
4.33x

1.77x
3.33x
1.29x
3.88x

Median
Mean

3.04x
3.12x

2.95x
2.96x

2.55x
2.57x

Aruba Operating Figures
Itwlied Enterprise Value
Net Debt
Implied Equity Value
Premium to Eliminate Minority Interes t
Shares Outstanding
Equity Value per Share

I

812.4 $
872.0 $ 1,038.0
2,472.9
2,568.0
2,646.9
291.0
29 1.0
29 1.0
2,763.9
2,859.0
2,937.9
20.00/o
20.0%
20.00/o
$ 3,316.6 $ 3,430.8 $ 3,525.5
108.32
108.32
108.32
$
30.62 $
31 .67 $
32.55
$

Note: (millions, except per share values).

86

Marcus Report at Exhibit 8-2. Note that the Marcus Report did not include LTM
Revenue multiples. The LTM Revenue multiples shown in this table were
calculated in the same manner as the 20 15E and 20 16E multiples.
87

Again, if Dages's 108.32MM shares outstanding is replaced with the 120.9MM
fully diluted shares outstanding calculated in the Marcus Report, the LTM, 2015E
and 2016E per share values would be $27.44, $28.38 and $29.17, respectively.
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87.

Based on the foregoing, I do not believe Dages 's comparable

company analysis supports his valuation of Aruba at $ 19.85 per share.

E.

COMPARABLE TRANSACTION ANALYSIS

88.

Unlike the Dages Report's Comparable Company Analysis that

valued Aruba using the Company' s latest twelve months ("LTM"), CY 2015E and
CY 2016E EBITDA, Dages' s Comparable Transaction Analysis only uses Aruba' s
LTM EBITDA. 88 As discussed in my opening report, at the time of the valuation
date, Aruba was in the midst of shifting from a revenue-focused company to one of
generating profits. Aruba' s value relies more on its expected future perfmmance
than on its past EBITDA performance. As such, Dages's Comparable Transaction
Analysis is irrelevant.
89.

Putting aside the fact that this methodology solely relies on Aruba' s

L TM EBITDA, the Dages Report notes that the Comparable Transaction Analysis
is "highly dependent on finding transactions where the acquired company is
sufficiently comparable to the company being valued. " 89 In deriving his list of
"sufficiently" comparable transactions, Dages used Capital IQ to search for
transactions that were greater than $1 billion and that occurred over the ten-year

88

Dages Report at Exhibit 10.

89

Dages Report at 36.
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period preceding the Aruba transaction.90 Additionally, the target companies had to
be located in the United States or Canada, operating in the same three SIC codes
91

that he used in his comparable companies analysis. This process resulted in 36
potentially comparable transactions. Dages then selected the median EBITDA
multiple of those deals to value Aruba (again, using LTM EBITDA data).92
90.

There are two primary issues with this analysis: (1) the time period

analyzed is not appropriate and (2) Dages uses a rote approach to identify
potentially comparable transactions.
91.

Concerning the time period analyzed, Dages looks at transactions

taking place in the previous 10 years. This is not appropriate given the
transformative changes that Aruba has experienced in the prior five years.
Therefore, utilizing transactions from more than 5 years ago is not a meaningful
exercise. Limiting Dages's results to only transactions that occurred in the five
years leading up to the Aruba transaction reduces his sample from 36 to 16
transactions.
92.

The problem with usmg this rote approach is that it relies on

transactions identified solely by SIC codes, without rev1ewmg the target

90

Dages Report at 36 and Exhibit 9.

91

Dages Report at 36.

92

Dages Report at 36 and Exhibits 9 and 10.
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companies' underlying business, and therefore irrelevant transactions get included
in the analysis. As noted jn the Marcus Report, using FactSet, I identified
approximately 70 potential comparable precedent transactions and narrowed the
list of comparable transactions down to 30. Of this group, I was not able to
determine sufficient comparability between this group of companies and Aruba.
93.

The Dages Report does not indicate that he performed any analysis of

the identified target companies' businesses in order to determine if those
transactions were "sufficiently comparable" to Aruba.
94.

The following table shows a summary of transaction targets I do not

consider comparable to Aruba, but which nevertheless are included in Dages's
comparable transactions analysis. This analysis was limited to only those
transactions which closed within five years preceding the closing of the Aruba
transaction. 93 As seen below, numerous target companies are not "sufficiently
comparable" 94 to be useful in determining the Company's fair value:

93

Based on the actual closing dates and not the erroneous dates repmied in the
Dages Report, Exhibit 9.

94

Dages Report at 36.
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I .trg.:t Natn.:
Fund tech Corp. (GfCR LLC)
Sapient Corp.

MICROS Systems, Inc.
OpenTable, Inc.
Fieldglass, Inc. (Madison Dearborn Partners)
Sourcefire, Inc.
Sunquest Infomntion Systems, lnc.
Radiant Systems, Inc.
Syniverse Holdings , lnc.
Eclipsys Corp.
Stanley, Inc.

Bus mess (I)

Software a.nd services for the Financial industry
Consuhantcy & nJat~ting services
Manufacturing infonnation solutions for the
hospitality and retail industries
Online reservation-taking services for restaurants
Human capital management
(..'yber security solutions
laboratory software
Hardware/Software for POS systems
Mobile network technology solutions
Performance management software
IT services

Notes:
( 1) This is a s hort description of the target's bus u1ess. A more conprehensive description can be found in
Exhibit 3.

95_

None of the targets included in Dages's comparable transactions

analysis have any substantial business in the enterprise WLAN market Many of
the targets listed only provide software or services, which require a substantially
different business model than that of Aruba's, which manufactures and sells
enterprise grade WLAN equipment
96.

In conclusion, Dages inappropriately uses a 10-year period in his

analysis, which is too long to provide meaningful valuation information and
includes numerous companies that are insufficiently comparable to Aruba to be
used in a comparable transaction valuation. Due to the numerous erroneous inputs
to Dages's analysis, the Dages Report's comparable transaction analysis cannot be
relied upon to provide an indication of Aruba's fair value.
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V.

LIMITING FACTORS AND OTHER ASSUMPTIONS
97.

In accordance with recognized professional ethics, my professional

fees for this service are not contingent upon the opinion expressed herein, and I do
not have a present or intended financial interest in the outcome of this matter.
98.

Public information, statistical information and data are from sources I

deem to be reliable. However, I make no representation as to the accuracy or
completeness of such information and data.
99.

It should be understood that I have reviewed numerous documents

related to this matter and I have set forth in this repmt only a summary of the
testimony I expect to provide at triaL I have not attempted to set forth verbatim
every fact that supports my opinion. I reserve the right to supplement or amend this
report should any additional information become available.
Dated:

September 2, 2016

Paul A. Marcus, CFA, CFE
PM Financial Expert Consultants, LLC
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